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The concept of power plays an important role in the social sciences
and Castelfranchi [2, 3] emphasizes the importance of this concept
for multiagent systems. In [1] we build upon this work by distin-
guishing four viewpoints on multiagent systems: a mind structure,
a power structure, a dependence structure and a coalition structure.
These viewpoints are increasingly abstract conceptualizations of sys-
tems as collections of autonomous cognitive agents. In this paper we
formally deﬁne one kind of power and coalition structures, and an
abstraction from this power to its coalition structure.
1 Power Structure
Power structures are a more abstract conceptualization of a multia-
gentsystemthantheusualone,becauseitdoesnotmentionactionsor
capabilities of agents. They directly characterize the power of agents
as the goals they can achieve. We do not discuss here how a power
structure can be derived from the mind structure in which actions are
explicitly represented, see [1].
A power structure is composed of a set of agents Ag, a set of all
goals G, a function goals: Ag ! 2
G that associates with each agent
the subset of goals G it desires to achieve, and, ﬁnally, a function
pow: 2Ag ! 2
2G
that associates with a set of agents A the sets of
goals they have the power to achieve, provided that the set of agents
A is minimal with respect to set inclusion among sets of agents that
can do so. In this paper we only consider power structures of which
the function pow satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. If a set of agents has the power to achieve goal g, then there is at
least an agent in Ag that desires this goal g.
2. All agents A are necessary to achieve a set of goals in pow(A).
There are no superﬂuous agents.
3. The function pow is continuous, in the sense that if a set of
agents A has the power to achieve a set of goals D, then for all
subsets of goals D
0 µ D there is a subset of agents A
0 µ A that
has the power to achieve this subset of goals D
0.
In a compositional power structure, the function pow also satisﬁes
the following condition:
4. If two sets of agents A1 and A2 have the power to achieve respec-
tively the sets of goals D1 and D2, then there exists a subset of all
the agents A1 [A2, with the power to achieve all goals D1 [D2.
In the last condition, note that the set of agents with the power to
achieve D1 [ D2 is not necessarily A1 [ A2, because an agent can
become superﬂuous in the union. Compositional power structures are
abstractionsofconﬂictfreemultiagentsystems,suchas,forexample,
systems in which all actions can be executed simultaneously.
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Deﬁnition 1 A power structure, PS, is a tuple
hAg;G;goals: Ag ! 2
G;pow: 2Ag ! 2
2G
i
where Ag is a set of agents, G a set of goals, goals is a function that
associates with each agent in Ag the subset of goals G it desires to
achieve, and pow is a function that associates with every set of agents
a set of sets of goals that the agents can achieve, such that for all sets
of agents Aµ Ag and for all sets of goals D2 pow(A) the following
conditions hold:
1. Dµ
S
a2Ag goals(a)
2. 8D
0 ¶ D 8A
0 ½ A [D
0 62 pow(A
0)]
3. 8D
0 µ D 9A
0µ A [D
02 pow(A
0)]
A compositional power structure is a power structure of which the
function pow also satisﬁes the following condition for all sets of
agents A1;A2 µ Ag and for all sets of goals D1 2 pow(A1) and
D22 pow(A2):
4. 9Aµ A1 [ A2 [D1 [ D22 pow(A)]
The strongest assumption of power structures seems to be the second
condition, because it cannot discriminate between cases in which the
agents can achieve a set of goals only by themselves, or they can
achieve them either by themselves or they can achieve them by work-
ing together, and maybe more efﬁciently or cheaply. We do not fur-
ther consider this issue of costs of actions in this paper, but we turn
to a notion of coalitions.
2 Coalition Structure
A coalition structure describes a set of agents that can decide to work
together to achieve a set of goals, and it thus represents the possible
coalitions in a multiagent structure. It captures two properties of a
coalition not captured by a power structure. The ﬁrst property states
that coalition structures consider only agents that are not altruistic,
i.e., agents that accept to be partners in a coalition only if they beneﬁt
from it. The second property states that a union of sub-coalitions is
not called a coalition if the formation of one of them cannot interfere
with the formation of the others.
Now we provide a formal deﬁnition. A coalition structure has the
same elements as a power structure, but it satisﬁes other conditions.
It is composed of a set of agents Ag, a set of all goals G, a function
goals : Ag ! 2
G and a function coal : 2Ag ! 2
2G
that associates
with a set of agents the sets of goals they can achieve by forming
a coalition. If coal(A) is empty for a set of agents A, then this set
of agents cannot form a coalition at all. The function coal satisﬁes
the following conditions, where the ﬁrst one is a specialization of the
ﬁrst condition of the function pow, the second condition is identical
to the second condition of the function pow, and the third and fourth
condition correspond to the new properties of coalition structures:1. If a goal g is achieved by forming a coalition, then at least an agent
in the coalition desires this goal g.
2. All agents A are necessary to achieve a set of goals in coal(A).
Coalitions do not admit superﬂuous members.
3. A coalition can be formed only if all the members beneﬁt from it.
4. A coalition cannot be decomposed in sub-coalitions unless for
each sub-coalition there is an agent necessary to achieve a goal
of another sub-coalition, and there is at least an agent that beneﬁts
from another sub-coalition.
A compositional coalition structure is a coalition structure in which
the function coal also satisﬁes the following condition, which is im-
plied by the condition of compositional power structures:
5. The achievement capability of coalitions is monotone with respect
to the containment relation for sets of agents: if a coalition of
agents A2 can achieve the set of goals D2 2 coal(A2) and a sub-
coalition A1 µ A2 can achieve the set of goals D1, then goals of
the sub-coalition D1 can be transferred to the goals of coalition
D2.
Deﬁnition 2 Let P(S) be the set of all partitions of the set S.
A coalition structure, CS, is a tuple
hAg;G;goals: Ag ! 2
G;coal: 2Ag ! 2
2G
i
where Ag is a set of agents, G a set of goals, goals is a function that
associates to each agent a subset of goals G it desires to achieve,
and coal is a function that associates with each set of agents a set of
sets of goals such that for all sets of agents Aµ Ag and for all sets
of goals D 2 coal(A) the following conditions hold:
1. Dµ goals(A)
2. 8D
0 ¶ D 8A
0 ½ A [D
0 62 coal(A
0)]
3. 8a2 A [D \ goals(a) 6= ;]
4. 8fA1;:::;Ang2 P(A) 8fD1;:::;Dng2 P(D)
[(8i [Di2 coal(Ai)]) =)
(9¼(n)2 ¦(n) 8i [goals(A¼(i)) \ D¼((i+1) mod n) 6= ;])]
where for a set A µ Ag, goals(A) =
S
a2A goals(a) and ¦(n) for
the set of the permutations of f1;:::;ng.
A compositional coalition structure is a coalition structure of
which the function coal also satisﬁes the following condition: for all
sets of agents A1;A2 µ Ag and for all sets of goals D1 2 coal(A1)
and D22 coal(A2):
5. A1µ A2 =) 8Dµ D1 : [D [ D22 coal(A2)]
We formalized a weak notion of decomposition. E.g., the fourth
condition of a more sophisticated deﬁnition also has to hold for a
decomposition with one agent overlap between sub-coalitions.
3 Abstraction from power to coalition
An abstraction of a coalition structure from a power structure is de-
rived as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 Given hAg;G;goals : Ag ! 2
G;pow : 2Ag ! 2
2G
i,
the reduction of the power structure is deﬁned as follows.
1. For all sets A µ Ag, remove from pow(A) all sets of goals that
violate the ﬁrst or third condition of a coalition structure.
2. For i := 1 to jAgj, for any A µ Ag with jAj = i, remove from
pow(A) all sets of goals that violate the fourth condition.
Theorem 1 A reduced power structure satisﬁes all conditions of a
coalition structure. A reduced compositional power structure satis-
ﬁes all conditions of a compositional coalition structure.
Deﬁnition 4 A coalition structure CS is relative to a power struc-
ture PS iff CS is the reduction of the power structure, renaming pow
to coal. In such cases, we say that the coalition structure CS is an
abstraction of the power structure PS, and that the power structure
PS is a reﬁnement of the coalition structure CS.
Theorem 2 Given two functions f;h: 2Ag ! 2
2G
, we say that f µ
h if for all Aµ Ag we have f(A)µ h(A). Let a coalition structure
CS be an abstraction of a power structure PS. Then coal µ pow
and there does not exist f µ pow such that CS with f is a coalition
structure, and coal½ f. The converse not necessarily holds.
Theorem 3 For every power structure, there is a unique coalition
structure that is an abstraction of it. For every compositional power
structure, there is a unique compositional coalition structure that is
an abstraction of it.
Theorem 4 A reﬁnement does not have to be unique.
Proof. Consider three agents Ag = fa1;a2;a3g, three goals G =
fg1;g2;g3g, and goals(ai) = fgig for i = 1;2;3. Moreover, con-
sider PS1 with pow(fa1g) = ffg2gg, pow(fa2g) = ffg3gg,
and pow(fa3g) = ffg1gg, and PS2 with pow(fa1g) = ffg3gg,
pow(fa2g) = ffg1gg, and pow(fa3g) = ffg2gg (and pow(A1 [
A2) = pow(A1)[pow(A2)). Both PS1 and PS2 have the same ab-
straction with coal(Ag) = fGg, and for all A ½ Ag : coal(A) = ;.
A drawback of the present deﬁnitions is that we do not have that
for every coalition structure, there is a power structure that reﬁnes it,
and likewise, for every compositional coalition structure, there is a
compositional power structure that reﬁnes it.
4 Conclusions and related work
We deﬁne power structure as sets of goals agents can achieve, and
coalition structures as reductions of power structures in which agents
are not altruistic and sets of agents cannot be decomposed in sub-
coalitions. Moreover, we deﬁne an abstraction from a power to its
coalition structure. In further research we consider power and coali-
tion structures based, e.g., on stronger decomposition conditions.
Conte and Sichman [4] use graph theory to emphasize the topol-
ogy of achievement dependencies, and the possibility to form coali-
tions. We focus on the composition problem of different coalitions
and we constrain coalitions not to be decomposable in unrelated
coalitions. Shehory and Kraus [6] deﬁne coalition in terms of tasks
and capabilities, instead of in terms of goals and power. Finally,
Pauly [5] only considers coalitions that can achieve states, regardless
of whether these states satisfy goals of the agents in the coalition,
while we consider only coalitions where each agent both contributes
to and receives from being in a coalition.
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